Creating Military Power

The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency

Barry R. Posen argues in Restraint, has grown incapable of moderating its ambitions in international politics. Since the collapse of Soviet power, it has pursued a grand strategy that he calls "liberal hegemony," one that Posen sees as unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. Written for policymakers and observers alike, Restraint explains precisely why this grand strategy works poorly and then provides a carefully designed alternative grand strategy and an associated military strategy and force structure. In contrast to the failures and unexpected problems that have stemmed from America’s consistent overreaching, Posen makes an urgent argument for restraint in the future use of U.S. military strength. After setting out the political implications of restraint as a guiding principle, Posen sketches the appropriate military forces and posture that would support such a strategy. He works with a deliberately constrained notion of grand strategy and, even more important, of national security (which he defines as including sovereignty, territorial integrity, power position, and safety). His alternative for military strategy, which Posen calls "command of the commons," focuses on protecting U.S. global access through naval, air, and space power, while freeing the United States from most of the relationships that require the permanent stationing of U.S. forces overseas.

The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency

Om sovjetisk militær doktrin og strategi samt en analyse af sovjetisk litteratur, der behandler emnet

The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine
Where To Download The Sources Of Military Doctrine France Britain And Germany Between The World Wars Cornell Studies In Security Affairs

Understanding Military Doctrine In this sobering book Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.

Emerging Technologies and Military Doctrine This book explores the attitudes of the Spanish army officer corps towards the evolution of warfare during the early decades of the twentieth century, and their influence on the armies of the Spanish Civil War. It examines how the Spanish military coped with technological innovations such as the machine gun and the tank, how it adapted the army’s battlefield doctrine to changes in warfare before the Civil War, and the influence of this doctrine on the outcome of the conflict. Of the different armed forces that fought in the Spanish Civil War, it is paradoxically the Spanish army that remains most forgotten - especially its military doctrine. Scholarship on the Spanish military in this period focuses on its politics, ideology and institutional reforms, touching upon 'hard' professional issues only superficially, if at all. Based on original research and using largely unstudied Spanish primary sources, this book fills a major scholarly gap in the history of the Spanish army and the Spanish Civil War.

Soviet Military Doctrine

Inadvertent Escalation

The Sources of Military Doctrine

Restraint

Imagining War This book offers a timely and compelling explanation for the deterioration of U.S.-China security relations during the Obama Presidency. The U.S.-China relationship has become one of (if not the most) vital features of contemporary world politics, and with arrival the Donald Trump to the White House in 2017, this vital geopolitical relationship sits at a precarious and dangerous crossroads. This book assesses a wide array of sources to systematically unpack the policy rhythms, drivers, and dynamics that defined the course of Sino-American security relations during the Obama-era. It fills several gaps in the literature on international security and conflict and offers a nuanced and innovative comparative approach to examine individual military domains. The case study chapters draw on recent Chinese and English sources - on military doctrine, capabilities, and defense strategy - to build a clear understanding the main sources of U.S.-China misperceptions, and highlight the problems these assessments can create for the conduct of statecraft across strategically competitive geopolitical dyads. The book builds a sobering picture of U.S.-China relations that will appeal to specialists and generalists alike with an interest in future warfare, emerging military-technologies, military studies, arms control, and foreign policy issues in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly.
Mid-twentieth Century American Military Doctrine

This book aims to document from basic Soviet sources the development of Soviet military doctrine and its impact upon the Soviet Armed Forces. It examines the content of Soviet military doctrine and focuses on Soviet military doctrine as it passed through the short regimes of Andropov and Chernenko.

The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine

This book puts military doctrine into a wider perspective, drawing on military history, philosophy, and political science. Military doctrines are institutional beliefs about what works in war; given the trauma of 9/11 and the ensuing 'War on Terror', serious divergences over what the message of the 'new' military doctrine ought to be were expected around the world. However, such questions are often drowned in ferocious meta-doctrinal disagreements. What is a doctrine, after all? This book provides a theoretical understanding of such questions. Divided into three parts, the author investigates the historical roots of military doctrine and explores its growth and expansion until the present day, and goes on to analyse the main characteristics of a military doctrine. Using a multidisciplinary approach, the book concludes that doctrine can be utilized in three key ways: as a tool of command, as a tool of change, and as a tool of education. This book will be of much interest to students of military studies, civil-military relations, strategic studies, and war studies, as well as to students in professional military education.

The Sources of Military Doctrine

This book discusses the existing literature on military doctrines in general, and offensive doctrines in particular, as well as on causes of their stagnation and sources of innovation. It provides the backdrop for an analytical historical review of Israel's offensive military doctrine.

An Army Transformed

"This study asks how Airmen and Marines can set aside their differences regarding command and control of airpower, and integrate their forces to accomplish assigned missions. It opens with an in-depth analysis of the command and control doctrine of each service, breaking down the concepts and terminology that Airmen and Marines use to describe command, control, and execution, revealing where they differ, or share common views. This sets the stage for a disciplined analysis of the differences between Air Force and Marine Corps command and control doctrine, using Barry Posen's organizational perspective; referencing the three significant causal forces of purpose, people, and environment. The analysis begins with delineation of each service's roles and missions - its purpose. It continues with a historical analysis of the operational experiences and cognitive development of doctrine and concepts, as influenced by the people that form each service and the environment in which they operate. Beginning in World War I and ending with Operation Desert Storm, the analysis summarizes how each service developed their concepts of airpower."--Abstract.

Engaging the Enemy

Did a "doctrine race" exist alongside the much-publicized arms competition between East and West? Using recent insights from organization theory, Kimberly Marten Zisk answers this question in the affirmative. Zisk challenges the standard portrayal of Soviet military officers as bureaucratic actors wedded to the status quo: she maintains that when they were confronted by a changing external security environment, they reacted by producing innovative doctrine. The author's extensive evidence is drawn from newly declassified Soviet military journals, and from her interviews with retired high-ranking Soviet General Staff officers and highly placed Soviet-Russian civilian defense experts. According to Zisk, the Cold War in Europe was powerfully influenced by the reactions of Soviet military officers and civilian
defense experts to modifications in U.S. and NATO military doctrine. Zisk also asserts that, contrary to the expectations of many analysts, civilian intervention in military policy-making need not provoke pitched civil-military conflict. Under Gorbachev's leadership, for instance, great efforts were made to ensure that "defensive defense" policies reflected military officers' input and expertise. Engaging the Enemy makes an important contribution not only to the theory of military organizations and the history of Soviet military policy but also to current policy debates on East-West security issues. Kimberly Marten Zisk is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Faculty Associate of the Mershon Center at the Ohio State University.

Russian Imperial Military Doctrine and Education, 1832-1914 In this innovative theoretical book, Elizabeth Kier uses a cultural approach to take issue with the conventional wisdom that military organizations inherently prefer offensive doctrines. Kier argues instead that a military's culture affects its choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. Drawing on organizational theory, she demonstrates that military organizations differ in their worldview and the proper conduct of their mission. It is this organizational culture that shapes how the military responds to constraints, such as terms of conscription set by civilian policymakers. In richly detailed case studies, Kier examines doctrinal developments in France and Great Britain during the interwar period. She tests her cultural argument against the two most powerful alternative explanations and illustrates that neither the functional needs of military organizations nor the structural demands of the international system can explain doctrinal choice. She also reveals as a myth the argument that the lessons of World War I explain the defensive doctrines in World War II. Imagining War addresses two important debates. It tackles a central debate in security studies: the origins of military doctrine. And by showing the power of a cultural approach, it offers an alternative to the prevailing rationalist explanations of international politics. Originally published in 1997. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

The Sources of Military Doctrine

Strategic Culture as the Sources of Military Changes In The Military Lens, Christopher P. Twomey shows how differing military doctrines have led to misperceptions between the United States and China over foreign policy—and the potential dangers these might pose in future relations. Because of their different strategic situations, histories, and military cultures, nations may have radically disparate definitions of effective military doctrine, strategy, and capabilities. Twomey argues that when such doctrines—or "theories of victory"—differ across states, misperceptions about a rival's capabilities and intentions and false optimism about one's own are more likely to occur. In turn, these can impede international diplomacy and statecraft by making it more difficult to communicate and agree on assessments of the balance of power. When states engage in strategic coercion—either to deter or to compel action—such problems can lead to escalation and war. Twomey assesses a wide array of sources in both the United States and China on military doctrine, strategic culture, misperception, and deterrence theory to build case studies of attempts at strategic coercion during Sino-American conflicts in Korea and the Taiwan Strait in the early years.
of the Cold War, as well as an examination of similar issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict. After demonstrating how these factors have contributed to past conflicts, Twomey amply documents the persistence of hazardous miscommunication in contemporary Sino-American relations. His unique analytic perspective on military capability suggests that policymakers need to carefully consider the military doctrine of the nations they are trying to influence.

Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy

The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine En analyse af Sovjetunionens sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitiske synspunkter set i lyset af de tilsvarende amerikanske.

Offense And Defense In Israeli Military Doctrine

Chemical Warfare in Soviet Military Doctrine This work examines the evolution of military-scientific research and theory as it was taught to student-officers at the Nicholas Academy. It is the only work (in English or Russian) to focus on this intellectual-institutional dialogue in the context of evolving professional responsibilities of the Russian Imperial General Staff during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The book contains five portraits of influential Russian military theorists and educational administrators. Russian Imperial Doctrine features extensive use of original Russian language bibliographic sources and extensive use of French, British and American archival sources. Chapter One examines the introduction of post-Napoleonic strategic theory to Russian military traditions via the establishment of a higher military-educational institution to instruct officers of the Russian Imperial Army in the theory of conducting large-scale warfare. Chapter Two illustrates the interaction of the liberal intellectual community at the Academy with the Imperial Russian Geographical Society in the years before the Crimean War (1853-56). Chapter Three begins with a discussion of the confusion in the Russian military liberal-intellectual community over the wild fluctuations in Imperial policy toward reform in the mid to late 1850's. This is followed by a discussion of the era of institution-wide reform in the Russian Army and the Nicholas Academy under the tutelage of the newly appointed War Minister, D.A. Miliutin. Chapter Four discusses the dismissal of War Minister Miliutin in 1881 and the extent to which political conservatism dismantled the reformed military institutions and effected the curriculum of the Nicholas Academy. Chapter Five discusses the reform of military institutions and theory in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05. This book serves equally well as a text for courses in Russian History, European Military Policy and Strategy, the History of Operational Art, and Military Command and Leadership.

Chemical Weapons In Soviet Military Doctrine

Soviet Military Doctrine The Polaris and Trident II SLBM weapon systems were developed by the U.S. Navy during periods of major strategic nuclear modernization, when national leaders were concerned about the vulnerability of U.S. Air Force land based nuclear forces to Soviet attack. Both Navy systems provided a superior alternative to bomber and ICBM weapon systems of the time, but only Polaris provoked innovative changes in U.S. nuclear doctrine. These cases of innovative and stagnant doctrine are compared and used to test the explanatory
power of three competing theories of the sources of innovative military doctrine. The three theories hypothesize independent, explanatory roles for civil-military conflict, intra-service bargaining, and interservice competition. The first case shows a strong causal link between intense interservice competition, a Navy decision to develop Polaris as an alternative to Air Force land-based forces, and an ensuing improvement in the survivability of those land-based forces. The second case shows a somewhat weaker correlation between institutionalized interservice cooperation, a Navy decision to develop Trident II as a complement rather than an alternative to land-based forces, and the absence of any ensuing improvement in the survivability of those forces. Thus, Polaris caused an innovative change in nuclear doctrine while Trident II did not, and the cases show that differing patterns of interservice relations had more to do with these outcomes than civil-military or intraservice relations. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the sources of different patterns of interservice relations, and argues that civilian defense leaders can manipulate interservice competition to cause doctrinal innovation.

The Sources of Military Doctrine

Soviet Military Doctrine "During the 2 decades preceding the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. Army went through tremendous reform and rejuvenation. In explaining this important case of military change, this paper makes four central arguments. First, leaders within military organizations are essential; external developments most often have an indeterminate impact on military change. Second, military reform is about more than changing doctrine. To implement its doctrine, an organization must have appropriate training practices, personnel policies, organizations, equipment, and leader development programs. Third, the implementation of comprehensive change requires an organizational entity with broad authority able to craft, evaluate, and execute an integrated program of reforms. In the case of the U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s, this organization was the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). To an unprecedented degree, TRADOC was able to ensure that changes in personnel policies, organizations, doctrine, training practices, and equipment were integrated and mutually reinforcing. Fourth and finally, the process of developing, implementing, and institutionalizing complementary reforms can take several decades. While today's demands differ from those of the past, this report suggests questions that may be useful in thinking about change today. Knowing the answers to these questions would enable informed judgment about the prospects for the successful implementation of a program of reforms. The consequences, for good or for ill, could be quite significant in terms of resources, lives, and the national interest."—P. vii-viii.

Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine Originally published in 1953, Soviet Military Doctrine by Soviet analyst Raymond L. Garthoff was prepared as part of the research program undertaken for the United States Air Force by The RAND Corporation. At the time of its first publication, Soviet Military Doctrine was the most complete and authoritative study available of the basic military science of the USSR. "Garthoff again joins the debate on nuclear deterrence and Moscow's military intentions. He draws on previously confidential Soviet sources—including a complete file of the Soviet general staff journal—to interpret new developments and changes in the Kremlin's strategic policy. Highly recommended for academic libraries."—James R. Kuhlman, University of Georgia Library, Athens

Friction in Command and Control Barry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy—that
collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security. Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent characteristics, its integration of military resources with political aims, and the degree of military or operational innovation it contains. He then examines these components of doctrine from the perspectives of organization theory and balance of power theory, taking into account the influence of technology and geography. Looking at interwar France, Britain, and Germany, Posen challenges each theory to explain the German Blitzkrieg, the British air defense system, and the French Army's defensive doctrine often associated with the Maginot Line. This rigorous comparative study, in which the balance of power theory emerges as the more useful, not only allows us to discover important implications for the study of national strategy today, but also serves to sharpen our understanding of the origins of World War II.

Strategic Culture as the Sources of Military Changes

Deterrence, War-fighting and Soviet Military Doctrine In this book, Soviet expert Raymond L. Garthoff makes use of unique, newly available material--including a complete file of the confidential Soviet General Staff journal--to illuminate the development of Soviet military thinking.

The Sources of Military Doctrine - a Lesson from the Cold War In varying circumstances, military organizations around the world are undergoing major restructuring. This book explores why, and how, militaries change.

Alliance Management and Maintenance

The Sources of Military Change

Basic Sources of Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy Soviet perceptions of American strategic doctrine have influenced the use of military power in foreign policy. An understanding of how those perceptions are being derived and of their specific contents is therefore essential to any reflection on direction that American defense policy should take. Particularly in the field of arms control and disarmament, Soviet perceptions carry severe implications for U.S. proposals as well as general behavior. Lockwood bases his examination on Soviet sources such as newspapers, periodicals, radio broadcasts, and books. He establishes that Soviet analysts tend to project their own notions of clear strategy onto U.S. doctrine and intentions. Starting from the premise that the Soviets mean what they say Lockwood is able to give a historical account of Soviet perceptions starting from "massive retaliation" up to and including Presidential Directive 59. In his final chapter, the author gives possible policy strategies to successfully counteract the Soviet military policy.

The Military Lens Barry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy—that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security. Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent characteristics, its integration of military resources with political aims, and the degree of military or operational innovation it contains. He then examines these components of doctrine from the perspectives of organization theory
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The Spanish Military and Warfare from 1899 to the Civil War This book aims to document from basic Soviet sources the development of Soviet military doctrine and its impact upon the Soviet Armed Forces. It examines the content of Soviet military doctrine and focuses on Soviet military doctrine as it passed through the short regimes of Andropov and Chernenko.

The Israeli Arms Industry Historical research on the German army of the interwar period has concentrated on the development of the so-called 'Blitzkrieg'. However, Matthias Strohn shows that for most of the time the German army, restricted by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, was too weak to launch an offensive war or even effectively repel an invader. Accordingly, the army focused instead primarily on planning a defensive war against superior enemies, especially France and Poland. Making extensive use of German archival sources, Strohn explores the development of military thought and doctrine for the defence of Germany and shows how these ideas were tested in war games and staff rides. His findings comprehensively revise our understanding of the German army in this period, shedding new light on the ideas of leading figures in the German military and how events, such as the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, influenced military planning.

The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine Creating Military Power examines how societies, cultures, political structures, and the global environment affect countries' military organizations. Unlike most analyses of countries' military power, which focus on material and basic resources—such as the size of populations, technological and industrial base, and GNP—this volume takes a more expansive view. The study's overarching argument is that states' global environments and the particularities of their cultures, social structures, and political institutions often affect how they organize and prepare for war, and ultimately impact their effectiveness in battle. The creation of military power is only partially dependent on states' basic material and human assets. Wealth, technology, and human capital certainly matter for a country's ability to create military power, but equally important are the ways a state uses those resources, and this often depends on the political and social environment in which military activity takes place.

Sources of Japanese Military Doctrine

The German Army and the Defence of the Reich Providing new empirical data valuable to our understanding of NATO's post-Cold War evolution, this book offers a unique perspective on alliance management and maintenance. It sheds light on the continuing debate surrounding NATO's role in security, how the alliance will fight and whether NATO is properly structured to continue providing security for its member states.